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CONTRACTUAL INTERPRETATION IN INDIAN EVIDENCE ACT 




While much of the Commonwealth marches on to the call of the modern contextual 
approach to contractual interpretation,1 a number of jurisdictions have had to 
grapple with heeding that call, and catering to more than a century-old statute 
that may go against that call. Common to these jurisdictions is an Evidence Act 
derived from the Indian version drafted by Sir James Fitzjames Stephen in the 
19th century.2 These affected jurisdictions include the whole of India (save for 
Jammu and Kashmir), Pakistan, Bangladesh, Sri Lanka, Burma, as well as 
Malaysia, Singapore, Brunei, and parts of Africa and the West Indies.3 Relevant 
provisions of the Indian Evidence Act (and its derivatives4) have to be considered 
for their compatibility with the modern contextual approach,5 although this is 
either seldom or inadequately done.6 Rather, some of the affected jurisdictions 
have approached the potential incompatibility problem ‘pragmatically’. Rather 
than be left behind in a new commercial reality, such jurisdictions have, among 
other approaches, read aspects of the modern contextual approach into their 
version of the Indian Evidence Act. This allows for an adoption of the modern 
contextual approach within the framework of a decidedly fossilised legislative 
intent. The question that arises is whether such an approach, while commercially 
pragmatic, is theoretically and doctrinally sound. 
*  LLB (Hons) (NUS ), LLM (Harvard ), Assistant Professor, Faculty of Law, National University of 
Singapore. I would like to record my thanks to the extremely helpful comments of two anonymous 
referees and Yip Man. I would also like to thank Lam Zhen Yu for excellent research assistance with 
this article. All errors remain my own.
1 As restated by Lord Hoffmann in Investors Compensation Scheme Ltd v West Bromwich Building Society [1998] 
1 WLR 896 (House of Lords (HL)) 912–13. 
2 The Indian Evidence Bill was considered and passed on 12 March 1872 in India by the 13 members 
of the Viceroy’s Legislative Council: see J D Heydon, ‘The Origins of the Indian Evidence Act’ (2010) 
10 (1) Oxford University Commonwealth Law Journal, 1–2. 
3 Heydon (n 2) 13.
4 Collectively known as the ‘Indian Evidence Act’ henceforth, unless the context indicates otherwise.
5 Whichever version is assumed to apply.
6 For an exception, see V K Rajah, ‘Redrawing the Boundaries of Contractual Interpretation: From 
Text to Context to Pre-text and Beyond’ (2010) 22 Singapore Academy of Law Journal 513.
Published in Oxford University Commonwealth Law Journal, 2013 September, 
Vol. 13 (1), pp.17-48.
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The broad purpose of this article is to study some of the affected jurisdictions 
from a comparative perspective with three specific aims in mind. Firstly, relevant 
legislative provisions from the Indian Evidence Act will be examined to set the 
background for assessment. Secondly, this article will examine three responses 
from the affected jurisdictions to the incompatibilities: faithful adherence to the 
relevant legislative provisions; complete adoption of the modern contextual 
approach; and integration of the modern contextual approach into the relevant 
legislative provisions. Thirdly, this article argues that the challenge for the 
affected jurisdictions is to ascertain that correct balance between modern 
developments and fidelity to history, determined in part by the interaction 
between the common aims of contractual and statutory interpretation. This 
article suggests that while some jurisdictions affected by the Indian Evidence Act 
have correctly accepted the applicability of the modern contextual approach, 
they may not have adequately considered the extent to which that approach is 
compatible with the provisions of the Indian Evidence Act. It will be argued that 
the modern contextual approach is largely compatible with the Act, and that 
proper justification for the approach can and should be made with reference to 
the Act. 
B  the Modern contextuAl ApproAch In the IndIAn evIdence Act
1 Three Relevant but Distinct Questions
Before examining the compatibility of the modern contextual approach with the 
provisions of the Indian Evidence Act, it is necessary to first identify three relevant 
but distinct questions. The first question concerns the facts that may be proved. 
This is answered by Part I of the Indian Evidence Act. The primary rule is section 
5 of the Act, which provides that evidence may be given of the existence or non-
existence of every fact in issue or of any relevant fact, as defined by the Act. The 
second question concerns the mode of evidence that may be adduced to prove 
these facts. Part II of the Indian Evidence Act answers this question. Thus, even 
if a fact is declared to be relevant by Part I, certain types of evidence may not be 
adduced to prove such a fact if Part II excludes the adduction of such evidence. 
In the context of contractual interpretation, the second question assumes some 
significance because certain sections of the Indian Evidence Act, specifically 
those in Chapter VI, provide that certain facts to do with the existence of a 
contract, for example, may only be proved by documentary evidence and not oral 
evidence. 
The third question concerns the substantive rules that are applied in the 
interpretation of contracts. As will be seen, the Indian Evidence Act does not 
contain any rule that deals with the interpretation of contracts; the modern 
contextual approach finds no direct expression in the Act. Thus, the compatibility 
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of the modern contextual approach with the Indian Evidence Act arises indirectly: 
assuming that the non-provision of the modern contextual approach does not 
preclude its application, the question then is whether the provisions in the Act 
concerning the facts that may be proved, and the evidence that may be adduced 
to prove those provable facts, so hamper the application of the modern contextual 
approach that it is rendered a dead letter. 
2 Relevant Facts and the Parol Evidence Rule
As already mentioned, it is the first two questions that find expression in the Indian 
Evidence Act. The first question affects contractual interpretation by stipulating 
the relevant (and hence provable) facts. According to Stephen, facts may be related 
to rights and liabilities either by (a) constituting such a state of things that the 
existence of the disputed right or liability would be a legal inference from the fact 
(such facts are known as ‘facts in issue’), or (b) affecting the probability of the 
existence of facts in issue (known as ‘relevant facts’).7 Only facts that come within 
these two definitions may be proved. This affects the facts that may be proved 
when a contract is being interpreted. Its effect on the modern contextual approach 
is indirect: if the ambit of provable facts is narrow, then the underlying premise of 
the contextual approach—which is that almost all background information should 
be considered—would be undermined. And if this is undermined too severely, 
then the modern contextual approach may not even be applicable even though the 
Indian Evidence Act does not expressly exclude it. We will consider the reach of 
the relevant provisions in the discussion below.
The second question assumes importance by preserving various aspects8 of the 
parol evidence rule. This concerns the evidence that may be adduced to prove 
facts that are relevant by virtue of Part II of the Indian Evidence Act, with aspects 
of the common law parol evidence rule finding expression in Chapter VI of the 
Act. At common law, the parol evidence rule is a manifestation of the objective 
theory of contract.9 One aspect of the rule holds that parties who have reduced a 
contract to writing should be bound by it alone. Over time, this aspect of the parol 
evidence rule has become much narrower: only extrinsic evidence which ‘add to, 
vary or contradict’ the written contract are excluded and all other evidence can 
be adduced to prove the terms of the contract. Indeed, even more exceptions have 
been formulated to this aspect of the rule and it is usually regarded as a relic of 
7 James Fitzjames Stephen, An Introduction to the Indian Evidence Act: The Principles of Judicial Evidence (2nd 
impression, Thacker, Spink & Co 1904) 12–13.
8 The Law Commission identified three distinct rules excluding extrinsic evidence, which collectively 
form the ‘parol evidence rule’: see Law Commission, Law of Contract: The Parol Evidence Rule (Law Com 
No 154, 1986) [1.2].
9 See generally Law Commission (n 7); D W McLauchlan, The Parol Evidence Rule (Professional Publications 
Ltd 1976).
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the past.10 In so far as contractual interpretation is concerned, another distinct11 
aspect of the parol evidence rule prohibits the admission of extrinsic evidence for 
this purpose unless there is a latent ambiguity to be cured. Where there is merely 
patent ambiguity, extrinsic evidence cannot be used to interpret the contract. 
This aspect of the parol evidence rule is today also regarded as largely defunct at 
common law.12 In particular, the modern contextual approach towards contractual 
interpretation allows the admission of almost all relevant evidence13—except for 
the well-known prohibitions against prior negotiations and subsequent conduct14—
regardless of the nature of the ambiguity present. Notwithstanding this status of 
the parol evidence rule at common law, it still remains very much relevant to 
those jurisdictions governed by the Indian Evidence Act. 
The Indian Evidence Act preserves the parol evidence rule by way of ten 
provisions.15 These provisions mirror three distinct rules of the common law 
parol evidence rule.16 The first rule is that the contents of certain documents—
where made provable under Part I of the Act—must be proved by production of 
the document, except where secondary evidence is permitted.17 The second rule 
is that extrinsic evidence is not admissible to ‘contradict, vary, add to or subtract 
from’ the terms of a written document, subject to certain provisos.18 Finally, the 
third rule is that evidence of specific facts may be admitted in aid of the 
interpretation or construction of certain documents.19 The third rule is the most 
relevant to contractual interpretation, but does not itself provide a substantive 
rule of contractual interpretation. 
The starting point is to consider section 91, the ‘proof by documentary evidence’ 
provision, which provides that:
When the terms of a contract or of a grant or of any other disposition of property have 
been reduced by or by consent of the parties to the form of a document, and in all cases 
10 See eg Law Commission (n 7) and G McMeel, The Construction of Contracts: Interpretation, Implication and 
Rectification (2nd edn, OUP 2011) 411.
11 Robert Stevens, ‘Objectivity, Mistake and the Parol Evidence Rule’ in Andrew Burrows and Edwin 
Peel (eds), Contract Terms (OUP 2007) 108, 109. The difference between ‘interpretation’ and ‘adding 
to, varying or contradicting’ a contract was explained in Arthur Linton Corbin, ‘The Interpretation 
of Words and the Parol Evidence Rule’ (1965) 50 Cornell Law Quarterly 161, 171.
12 See eg McMeel (n 10) 166–68.
13 Investors Compensation (n 1) 912–13.
14 Investors Compensation (n 1) 913. 
15 As the numberings of these provisions differ according to the jurisdiction concerned, they will be 
referred to in this paper by reference to their purpose. Where a provision is reproduced, it will be 
from the Indian Evidence Act rather than any of its derivative versions operative in other jurisdictions.
16 Singapore Academy of Law, Report of the Law Reform Committee on the Review of the Parol Evidence Rule 
(2006) [13].
17 Singapore Academy of Law (n 16) [13]. According to Stephen, primary documentary evidence is the 
document itself and secondary documentary evidence includes a copy of the document or an oral 
account of its contents: see James Fitzjames Stephen, A Digest of the Law of Evidence (1st edn, MacMillan 
and Co 1876) 67–68.
18 Singapore Academy of Law (n 16) [13].
19 Singapore Academy of Law (n 16) [13].
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in which any matter is required by law to be reduced to the form of a document, no 
evidence shall be given in proof of the terms of such contract, grant or other disposition 
of property or of such matter except the document itself, or secondary evidence of its 
contents in cases in which secondary evidence is admissible under the provisions of this 
Act.
This provision relates to the exclusiveness of documentary evidence and is an 
aspect of the ‘best evidence’ rule.20 Relatedly, it provides that where a contract has 
been reduced to a document, that document must be produced as proof, being the 
best evidence of the agreement reached between the parties. Oral evidence is 
admissible to prove the agreement only by way of exception, and the relevant 
exceptions are provided by section 92, the ‘exclusion of oral evidence’ provision. 
It provides that:
When the terms of any such contract, grant or other disposition of property, or any mat-
ter required by law to be reduced to the form of a document, have been proved accord-
ing to [the ‘proof by documentary evidence’ provision], no evidence of any oral 
agreement or statement shall be admitted as between the parties to any such instrument 
or their representatives in interest for the purpose of contradicting, varying, adding to, 
or subtracting from its terms [subject to provisos 1 to 6] . . .
Section 92 operates in conjunction with section 91. Section 92 operates only 
where the contract (among other documents) has been proved under section 91. 
It is therefore based on the same principle that documentary evidence is superior 
to oral evidence and no oral evidence is generally admissible to contradict, add 
to or subtract from the terms of the contract proved by way of documentary 
evidence.21 Section 91 is said to deal with the exclusiveness of documentary 
evidence whereas section 92 deals with the conclusiveness and inclusiveness of 
documentary evidence. It supplements section 91 by excluding extrinsic evidence 
that may be used to control its terms.22 Section 92 is, however, subject to six 
provisos, which largely replicate the exceptions to the parol evidence rule at 
common law. Under these provisos, parol evidence is admissible exceptionally to 
prove (1) any vitiating factor such as fraud or illegality; (2) a separate oral 
agreement that is not inconsistent with the terms of the written contract; (3) a 
separate oral agreement constituting a condition precedent to the written 
contract; (4) a distinct subsequent oral agreement to rescind or modify the written 
contract;23 (5) any usage or custom not expressly mentioned in the written contract 
(and not being inconsistent with its terms) but which are usually annexed to such 
20 Singapore Academy of Law (n 16) [31]. 
21 Singapore Academy of Law (n 16) [39]. See also M Monir, Principles and Digest of the Law of Evidence 
(Vol 1, 7th edn, The University Book Agency 1989) 969. 
22 Sudipto Sarkar and V R Manohar, Sarkar’s Law of Evidence (16th edn, LexisNexis Butterworths 2007) 
1461. 
23 Except in cases in which such contract, grant or disposition of property is by law required to be in 
writing, or has been registered according to the law in force for the time being as to the registration 
of documents.
22 Contractual Interpretation In Indian Evidence Act Jurisdictions ouclj vol 13 no 1
contracts; and (6) any fact which shows the manner the language of a document 
is related to existing facts. 
While provisos 1 to 5 largely replicate existing common law exceptions to the 
parol evidence rule, proviso 6 is slightly different. Although it appears as an 
exception to section 92, it is usually regarded as constituting a substantive rule 
concerning the proof of facts as aids to the interpretation of the contract.24 Support 
for such a view can be found in one of Stephen’s works on evidence published after 
the passage of the Indian Evidence Act. In Stephen’s Digest, Stephen viewed 
sections 91 and 92 collectively, under what he termed as ‘Article 90’.25 However, 
Article 90, while including provisos 1 to 5,26 did not contain proviso 6. Instead, 
proviso 6 was conceived as a sub-point under a separate ‘Article 91’, which dealt 
with ‘what evidence may be given for the interpretation of documents’.27 Stephen 
further noted that Articles 90 and 91 dealt with different matters: Article 91 dealt 
with the interpretation of documents by oral evidence whereas Article 90 defines 
the cases in which documents are exclusive evidence.28 Although arranged slightly 
differently in the Indian Evidence Act, the accepted view in relevant jurisdictions 
is that proviso 6 to section 92 is a substantive rule of its own.29
Thus, proviso 6 is more related to the next five provisions of the Indian Evidence 
Act, which together deal with the evidence that may be adduced to explain the 
terms proved under sections 91 and 92. These provisions correspond to sub-
points of Stephen’s ‘Article 91’ and start with section 93, the ‘patent ambiguity’ 
provision, which deals with the exclusion of evidence to explain or amend a 
document that is patently ambiguous. Section 93 provides that: ‘When the 
language used in a document is on its face ambiguous or defective, evidence may 
not be given of facts which would show its meaning or supply its defects.’ Therefore, 
in the instances where patent ambiguity arises—either by the language used 
being obviously uncertain (though intelligible), or so defective as to be 
meaningless—no evidence may be given to cure the ambiguity. This provision is 
based on the old cases of Clayton v Lord Nugent30 and Baylis v The Attorney General,31 
24 See, eg, Sarkar and Manohar (n 22) 1538; V Kesava Rao, Sir John Woodroffe & Syed Amir Ali’s Law of 
Evidence (18th edn, LexisNexis Butterworths 2009) 3711–12; Ratanlal Ranchhoddas and Dhirajlal 
Keshavlal Thakore, Ratanlal and Dhirajlal’s The Law of Evidence (23rd edn, LexisNexis Butterworths 
2010) 1148–49.
25 Stephen (n 17) 88–89.
26 See Stephen (n 17) 88–89.
27 See Stephen (n 17) 91–92.
28 See Stephen (n 17) 158. Indeed, the Law Commission of India, in their 69th and 185th Reports, 
which discussed various aspects of the Indian Evidence Act, discussed ‘the first five provisos’ and ‘the 
sixth proviso [ie, proviso 6]’ differently: see eg Law Commission of India, Review of the Indian Evidence 
Act, 1872 (185th Report, 2003) 441.
29 Eg Belapur Co v State Farming Corpn AIR (1969) Bom 231 (Bombay High Court (Bom HC)) [24]–[25]. 
It is also important to note that Stephen himself noted that Article 91 differed from the six similar 
propositions in James Wigram, Admission of Extrinsic Evidence in Aid of the Interpretation of Wills (2nd edn, 
Charles Hunter 1835) only in its arrangement and form of expression: see Stephen (n 17) 160–61.
30 (1844) 13 K & W 200, 153 ER 83.
31 (1741) 2 Atk 239, 26 ER 548.
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which each correspond to the illustrations accompanying the provision.32 In 
Clayton, a card which supplied meaning to initials appearing in a will was ruled 
inadmissible, whereas in Baylis, evidence as to the testator’s intention to fill in a 
blank was similarly held inadmissible.33 This has been explained on the basis 
that, in an instance of patent ambiguity, the intention of the maker of the contract 
becomes a matter of speculation and so the contract fails.34 
Closely related to section 93 is section 94, the ‘plain language’ provision. It 
provides that: ‘When language used in a document is plain in itself and when it 
applies accurately to existing facts, evidence may not be given to show that it was 
not meant to apply to such facts.’ This provision is the counterpart to section 93. 
Rather than be concerned with outward ambiguity, it is concerned with outward 
clarity, which arises because of the ‘plainness’ of the language when applied to 
existing facts. In such cases, no evidence may be admitted to explain that the 
contractual language was not meant to apply to such facts. Significantly, this 
provision is not only concerned with language that is ‘plain in itself’; importantly, 
the plain language must also apply ‘accurately to existing facts’.35 The additional 
requirement that the plain language apply accurately to existing facts raises the 
question, which we revisit below, of whether the Indian Evidence Act contains a 
plain meaning rule, that is, words are presumed to have certain fixed meanings. 
This may be regarded as another way of characterising a situation ‘where external 
circumstances do not create any doubt or difficulty as to the proper application 
of those words to claimants under the instrument . . .’36 As Denman LCJ said in 
Rickman v Carstairs, ‘[t]he question . . . is not what was the intention of the parties, 
but what is the meaning of the words they have used.’37 
The next three provisions concern latent ambiguity and provide instances 
where such ambiguity may be present. Latent ambiguity is one which ‘arise[s] 
extrinsically in the application of an instrument of clear and definite intrinsic 
meaning to doubtful subject-matter’.38 Since such ambiguities arise from an 
extrinsic fact, extrinsic evidence is admissible to explain away the ambiguity.39 
The first provision, section 95, refers to the situation where otherwise plain 
contractual language is rendered meaningless in reference to existing facts.40 This 
32 The second more than the first; however see Stephen (n 17) 92, 94, in which Stephen identifies these 
two cases as illustrating the equivalent of the ‘patent ambiguity’ provision.
33 Cf Price v Page (1799) 4 Ves Jun 679, 31 ER 351; Harrhy v Wall (1817) 1 B & Ald 103, 106 ER 39.
34 Sarkar and Manohar (n 22) 1552.
35 Daniel Seng, ‘Another Clog on the Construction of Contracts? Parol Evidence Rule and Use of 
Extrinsic Evidence’ [1997] Singapore Journal of Legal Studies 457, 488.
36 See Shore v Wilson (1842) 9 Cl & F 355, 565; 8 ER 450, 532. See also Seng (n 35) 488.
37 (1833) 5 B & Ad 651, 663; 110 ER 931, 935.
38 Thomas Starkie, A Practical Treatise of the Law of Evidence, and Digest of Proofs in Civil and Criminal 
Proceedings (Vol 3, 3rd edn, Stevens & Norton 1842) 755, 768.
39 See eg Doe d Oxenden v Chichester (1816) 4 Dow 65, 93; 3 ER 1091, 1100.
40 Cf Zurich Insurance (Singapore) Pte Ltd v B-Gold Interior Design & Construction Pte Ltd [2008] 3 SLR(R) 1029 
(Singapore Court of Appeal (Sing CA)) [79], in which the Court stated that this provision did not 
pertain to latent ambiguity since, after the context is considered, multiple meanings of the words in 
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provision finds expression in the common law of the time as well. For example, in 
Allgood v Blake,41 Blackburn J said that ‘[t]he general rule is to give the words their 
natural meaning unless, when applied to the subject matter . . . they produce . . . 
an absurdity.’42 The second provision, section 96, relates to an ‘equivocation’, or 
where the contractual language used might have been meant to apply to only one 
of several things that are each susceptible to the same description used. This is 
based on Doe v Needs,43 in which evidence of the testator’s statements of intention 
and circumstances were admissible to ascertain which of two ‘George Gords’ he 
meant.44 Finally, the third provision, section 97, concerns the situation where the 
contractual language could apply partially to two sets of existing facts but the 
whole does not apply correctly to either. This third instance is sometimes regarded 
as a specific application of the first instance.45 It is based on several cases,46 all of 
which illustrate that evidence of surrounding circumstances may be admitted to 
show which of two sets of existing facts the contract was meant to refer to.47 In all 
such instances, evidence may be admitted to explain away the latent ambiguity. 
The latent ambiguity that arises is also shown by recourse to extrinsic evidence 
in the first place. For example, in the case of equivocations, it is presupposed ‘that 
the resources of construction, aided by all admissible extrinsic facts, have been 
first exhausted’.48 It is after this threshold has been passed that extrinsic evidence 
showing the person or thing that the language was intended to apply to is 
admitted.49 
The final three provisions relevant to the evidence that may be adduced to 
explain the contractual terms, viz, sections 98 to 100, relate mainly to technical 
matters. There is section 98, the ‘evidence as to meaning of illegible characters’ 
provision, which allows the admission of evidence from experts and such persons 
to explain illegible writing. Then there is section 99, the provision that governs 
who may give evidence of an agreement varying terms of the written document. 
And finally there is section 100, the provision that provides that the previous 
provisions do not apply to the construction of wills. This article will not focus on 
these provisions of rather technical significance.
question do not exist; rather, the original language becomes meaningless in the light of the 
surrounding circumstances to convince the court that such language could not be used in its ‘plain’ 
sense.
41 (1873) LR 8 Ex 160.
42 ibid 163.
43 (1836) 2 M & W 129, 150 ER 698.
44 Stephen (n 17) 93, 95.
45 Singapore Academy of Law (n 17) [58].
46 Doe v Hiscocks (1839) 5 M & W 363, 151 ER 154; Ryall v Hannam (1847) 10 Beav 536, 50 ER 688; 
Stringer v Gardiner (1859) 27 Beav 35, 54 ER 14.
47 Stephen (n 17) 93–95.
48 James Thayer, A Preliminary Treatise on Evidence at the Common Law (first published 1898, Rothman 
Reprints 1969) 455.
49 Seng (n 35) 493.
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As can be seen, the Indian Evidence Act adopts an approach that fossilises, to 
a certain degree, various aspects of the parol evidence rule as it appeared in the 
19th century. It largely concerns two broad aspects of the parol evidence rule 
relevant to contracts: first, when evidence can be adduced to prove the terms of 
the contract (which are already rendered provable via Part I of the Indian 
Evidence Act), and second, when evidence can be adduced to explain the terms 
of the contract so discerned. As regards the second aspect, the Indian Evidence 
Act contains a series of provisions that sets out a detailed regime for the 
admissibility of evidence. The question that arises then is whether these provisions, 
together with their embedded ideas, are compatible with the modern contextual 
approach to contractual interpretation. 
c three Models of resolutIon
The modern contextual approach is typically traceable to Lord Hoffmann’s speech 
in Investors Compensation, where he summarised the modern contextual approach in 
five points. It is unnecessary to reproduce all of the well-known passage here, but it 
is possible to use it to discern several elements of the modern contextual approach. 
The key point made by Lord Hoffmann is that ‘[i]nterpretation is the ascertainment 
of the meaning which the document would convey to a reasonable person having 
all the background knowledge which would reasonably have been available to the 
parties in the situation in which they were at the time of the contract.’50 This is the 
essence of the modern contextual approach and posits that interpretation, properly 
understood, must not take place in a vacuum but, rather, in consideration of all the 
relevant background information. This approach shifted the substantive rules 
governing the interpretative process from focusing on the meaning of the words used 
in the document to focusing on what would be understood as the meaning of the 
person using those words. Notwithstanding—as will be seen—some distinctions 
between the Indian Evidence Act and the modern contextual approach, the 
jurisdictions governed by the Indian Evidence Act have shown various responses to 
the rise of the modern contextual approach. These approaches may be divided into 
three broad categories. 
1 Following the Status Quo: Adherence to the Indian Evidence Act
The first is to follow the status quo and adhere to the Indian Evidence Act more 
or less strictly. This is largely the approach taken in India, even if it has been said 
that not all the authorities speak with the same voice.51 The Indian approach is to 
treat proviso 6 of section 92 (the ‘exclusion of oral evidence’ provision) as a 
50 Investors Compensation (n 1) 912.
51 Zurich Insurance (n 40) [115].
26 Contractual Interpretation In Indian Evidence Act Jurisdictions ouclj vol 13 no 1
substantive provision of its own governing the admissible evidence in aid of the 
interpretation of written documents such as contracts, its operation dictated by 
the next five provisions of the Indian Evidence Act.52 The collective effect of these 
provisions is well summarised by the Bombay High Court in Ganpatrao Appaji v 
Bapu Thakaram: 
[W]here a document itself is a perfectly plain, straightforward document, no extrinsic 
evidence is required to show in what manner the language of the document is related to 
existing facts. There may be cases where such extrinsic evidence is required, and it will 
therefore be admitted. But it can only be in such cases where the terms of the documents 
themselves require explanation, evidence can be led within the restrictions laid down by 
the [proviso 6].53
Under this approach, the modern contextual approach towards contractual 
interpretation is not denied and is in fact indirectly recognised.54 It is only 
indirectly recognised because, as mentioned earlier, the Indian Evidence Act 
does not prescribe a substantive rule of contractual interpretation. What may be 
said at best is that the modern contextual approach is indirectly recognised 
because the ambit of admissible evidence in aid of interpretation is potentially 
large; this means that much of the context is potentially admissible, a lynchpin of 
the modern contextual approach. However, the extent of the recognition of the 
modern contextual approach is limited by the terms of the Indian Evidence Act. 
It follows that, if the language employed is ambiguous, the five provisions following 
the ‘exclusion of oral evidence’ provision would regulate the question of the 
admissibility of extrinsic evidence.55 Specifically, proviso 6 admits extrinsic 
evidence only where there is latent ambiguity in the contract, of which there are 
52 See eg Sarkar and Manohar (n 22) 1539.
53 AIR (1920) Bom 143 (Bom HC) [12].
54 See eg Govindram Mihamal v Chetumal Villardas AIR (1970) Bom 251 (Bom HC) [9]; H K Saharay, 
Dutt on Contract: The Indian Contract Act 1872 (10th edn, Eastern Law House 2006) 4, 22–24; 
R G Padia, Pollock & Mulla: Indian Contract and Specific Relief Acts (13th edn, LexisNexis Butterworths 
2007) 273–74.
55 See eg Rani Mewa v Hulas (1874) LR 1 IA 157 (PC) [4]; Bhairon v Janki (1897) 19 All 133 (Allahabad 
High Court (All HC)) [4]; Balkishen Dass v Legge (1899) LR 27 IA 58 (PC) [10]; Jafar v Ranjit (1899) 
ILR 21 All 4 (All HC) [7]; Ganpatrao Apaji (n 53) [11]; Martand v Amritrao AIR (1925) Bom 501 (Bom 
HC) [6]; Chunchun Jha v Ebadat Ali AIR (1954) SC 345 (India Supreme Court (India SC)) [16]; Belapur 
(n 29) [24]–[25]; Bhatt v V R Thakkar AIR (1972) Bom 365 (Bom HC) [3]. Cf Baijnath v Vally Mahommed 
AIR (1925) PC 75 (Privy Council (PC)) [22] (‘[The exclusion of oral evidence provision] merely 
prescribes a rule of evidence; it does not fetter the Court’s power to arrive at the true meaning and 
effect of a transaction in the light of all the surrounding circumstances.’); Buddhu Shaw v Mongal Shaw 
(1966) ILR 2 Cal 641 (Calcutta High Court (Cal HC)) [17], in which it was said: ‘The principle 
behind the rule, which the sixth proviso embodies, appears to be that in suitable cases, such as where 
the ‘haves’ prey upon the want and misery of the ‘have-nots’, it is the duty of the Court to get at the 
truth by entering into evidence with the subject of finding out in what manner the document’s 
language is related to the existing facts.’ This is unlikely to be correct; proviso 6 does not confer a 
power to the court to go behind otherwise unambiguous language where it would be ‘fair’ to do so 
owing to the unequal statuses of the contracting parties.
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several instances recognised in the Act.56 It has been said that legislature could 
not have intended to nullify the object of section 92 by enacting exceptions to that 
section.57 The corollary is also true: where there is no dispute on the meaning of 
terms as applied to existing facts, no extrinsic evidence is admissible to interpret 
the contract.58 Finally, where there is patent ambiguity, extrinsic evidence is 
inadmissible to interpret the contract in accordance with the ‘patent ambiguity’ 
provision.59 Thus, as Lord Atkin observed in Pakala Narayana Swami v R, ‘when the 
meaning of words is plain it is not the duty of the courts to busy themselves with 
supposed intention’.60 The presumption here is that the parties meant what they 
have written, ie, the plain meaning of the words. This limited (and indirect) 
recognition of the modern contextual approach, in line with the Indian Evidence 
Act, was summarised by the Andhra Pradesh High Court relatively recently in 
Pradeep Kumar v Mahaveer Pershad by way of five points, the most pertinent of which 
is this:
(5) in construing the document, the intention must be gathered from the document itself. 
However, if there is ambiguity in the language used in the document, it is permissible to 
look to surrounding circumstances to gather the intention, such as user or possession and 
enjoyment.61
2 Complete Adoption of Common Law Approach: Ignoring the Indian 
Evidence Act
The second approach is to ignore the terms of the Indian Evidence Act and adopt 
the modern contextual approach fully, without explaining why the latter is 
compatible with the former. To be fair, such an approach may not be substantively 
wrong; after all, the Indian Evidence Act does not prescribe or prohibit a specific 
56 The Chairman, Serajgunj Municipality v Chittagong Co Ltd (1922) 72 Ind Cas 969 (Cal HC) [5]; Basanti v 
Official Receiver AIR (1936) Lah 508 (Lahore High Court (Lah HC)) [3]; Ram Narain v Manki AIR 
(1954) Pat 562 (Patna High Court (Pat HC)) [15]–[16] (Cf Zurich Insurance (n 40) [116]–[118]); 
Chandra Sekhar v Mural Gope AIR (1957) Pat 673 (Pat HC) [3]; Firm Bolumal v Venkatachelapathi Rao AIR 
(1959) AP 612 (Andhra Pradesh High Court (Andh Prad HC)) [8]; Darshan Dass v Ganga Bux AIR 
(1962) Pat 53 (Pat HC) [6]; Ramprashad Sahu v Basantia AIR (1925) Pat 729 (Pat HC) [11]; Baleshwar 
v Lal Bahadur AIR (1972) Pat 87 (Pat HC) [10]; Pradeep Kumar v Mahaveer Pershad AIR (2003) AP 107 
(Andh Prad HC) [18]. The academic texts are united in adopting this approach: see Sarkar and 
Manohar (n 22) 1538–39; Rao (n 24) 3451, 3712; Ranchhoddas and Thakore (n 24) 1161. 
57 See Ranchhoddas and Thakore (n 24) 1151–52.
58 Balkishen Dass (n 55) [10]; Udai Pratap v Jagat Mohan AIR (1928) Pat 66 (Pat HC) [24]; Firm Bolumal 
(n 56) [8]; Radha Sundar v Mohd Jahadur AIR (1959) SC 24 (India SC) [6]; Darshan Dass (n 56) [6]; 
Kamala Devi v Takhatmal AIR (1967) JLJ 1020 SC (India SC) [8]–[9]; Palaniappan v Kuppammal (1974) 
ILR 3 Mad 545 (Madras High Court (Mad HC)) [14]. See also Sarkar and Manohar (n 22) 1549–50; 
Ranchhoddas and Thakore (n 24) 1149, 1151, 1159.
59 Deojit v Pitambar (1875) ILR 1 All 275 (All HC) [1]; Keshavlal Lallubhai Patel v Lalbhai Trikumlal Mills Ltd 
AIR (1958) SC 512 (India SC) [11]. 
60 AIR (1939) PC 47 (PC) [10] (Atkin LJ), albeit in the context of interpreting a statute; however, Lord 
Atkin did agree that this principle extended to all written instruments.
61 (n 56) [18].
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interpretative approach. The objection is, however, with not substantiating the 
adoption of the modern contextual approach with the terms of the Act. A related 
objection is also with admitting all manner of extrinsic evidence in line with the 
modern contextual approach but without considering whether this is prohibited 
or restricted legislatively. 
An example of such an approach can be seen in the Malaysian Federal Court 
decision of Berjaya Times Square Sdn Bhd (formerly known as Berjaya Dita Sdn Bhd) v 
M-Concept Sdn Bhd.62 In that case, Gopal Sri Ram FCJ held that an earlier 
statement by the same court in Nouvau Mont Dor (M) Sdn Bhd v Faber Development 
Sdn Bhd,63 that a document is to be construed from its four corners, was incorrect.64 
Instead, he referred to Investors Compensation, among other English cases, and said 
that a court interpreting a contract is entitled to look at the factual matrix forming 
the background of the transaction. This includes ‘all material that was reasonably 
available to the parties’.65 No mention was made of the Malaysian Evidence Act, 
which contains equivalent provisions as those discussed earlier. It appears 
therefore that the approach taken in Berjaya Times Square is to completely ignore 
the statutorily imposed limits and adopt the modern contextual approach. To be 
fair, there are also Malaysian cases that have followed the provisions of the 
Malaysian Evidence Act in dealing with the admissible extrinsic evidence for the 
purposes of contractual interpretation.66 Nonetheless, Berjaya Times Square is 
significant because it emanates from the highest court in Malaysia and was 
decided relatively recently.
3 Integration of the Common Law Approach: Liberal Interpretation 
of Indian Evidence Act
The third approach in dealing with the Indian Evidence Act is to integrate the 
common law approach with the Act through a ‘liberal’ interpretation of the Act. 
A prominent and recent example of this approach is that of the Singapore Court 
of Appeal in Zurich Insurance (Singapore) Pte Ltd v B-Gold Interior Design & Construction 
Pte Ltd.67 Justice Rajah, the author of the judgment, has written extra-judicially 
that a ‘purposive reading of the provisions [of the Singapore Evidence Act] with 
the benefit of the modern insights on interpretation does not compel . . . a 
conclusion [that such provisions demand the exclusion of extrinsic evidence]’.68 
62 [2010] 1 MLJ 597 (Malaysia Federal Court (Malaysia FC)).
63 [1984] 2 MLJ 268 (Malaysia FC) 271.
64 Berjaya Times Square (n 62) [43].
65 Berjaya Times Square (n 62) [42].
66 See eg the cases cited in Krishnan Arjunan and Abdul Majid bin Nabi Baksh, Contract Law in Malaysia 
(LexisNexis 2008) 189; Dato Seri Visu Sinnadurai, Law of Contract (4th edn, LexisNexis 2011) 251–59.
67 Zurich Insurance (n 40). Though see now, Sembcorp Marine Ltd v PPL Holdings PTE Ltd [2013] SGSA 43, 
which, while maintaining the legitimacy of Zurich Insurance, seems to have cut back on the extent for 
contractual interpretation in Singapore.
68 Rajah (n 6) 536.
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This is a broadly accurate summary of the approach taken in Zurich Insurance, 
which prescribed a two-step framework for the interpretation of contracts in 
Singapore, bearing in mind relevant provisions of the Singapore Evidence Act.69 
This framework rests upon an acceptance of the modern contextual approach, 
achieved by a ‘permissive interpretation’ of proviso 670 of section 94, the Singapore 
equivalent of section 92 of the Indian Evidence Act (the ‘exclusion of oral evidence’ 
provision).71 
The first step of the Zurich Insurance framework is to consider whether extrinsic 
evidence can be admitted. This thus relates to the first two questions raised at the 
start of this article. It was held in Zurich Insurance that no extrinsic evidence is 
admissible to contradict, vary, add to or subtract from the terms of a contract to 
which the parol evidence rule applies. However, extrinsic evidence is admissible 
to interpret the contract even if there is no ambiguity in the contract concerned.72 
Consistent with the modern contextual approach, whether the extrinsic evidence 
is admissible depends on whether it is (a) relevant (ie, it would affect the way in 
which the language of the document would have been understood by a reasonable 
man); (b) reasonably available to all the contracting parties;73 and (c) related to a 
clear and obvious context.74 According to the Singapore Court of Appeal, the 
extent of the admissible evidence is very broad and is not confined to empirical 
facts. This involves, in appropriate cases, a consideration of the commercial 
purpose of the contract in question.75 The Court also optimistically noted that the 
focus on the narrow task of ascertaining the parties’ objective intention ought to 
prevent the endless trawl through large amounts of allegedly useful background 
material, often in misguided attempts to persuade a court to favour a subjective 
intention.76
The second step of the Zurich Insurance framework concerns the task of 
interpretation under the modern contextual approach. This is the third question 
raised at the beginning of this article. Consistent with this approach, the Singapore 
Court of Appeal in Zurich Insurance noted that neither ambiguity nor the existence 
of an alternative technical meaning is a prerequisite for the court’s consideration 
69 1997 Rev Ed (c 97). This is modelled after the Indian Evidence Act.
70 Proviso (f ) in the Singapore Evidence Act.
71 Zurich Insurance (n 40) [114].
72 Zurich Insurance (n 40) [115]. 
73 Zurich Insurance (n 40) [125].
74 Zurich Insurance (n 40) [132] (Although at [129]: ‘In our view, the benefits of adopting, via proviso 6 to 
s 94, the contextual approach to contractual interpretation (viz, flexibility and accord with commercial 
common sense) will be maximised and its costs (viz, increased uncertainty and added litigation costs) 
minimised if, as a threshold requirement for the court’s adoption of a different interpretation from 
that suggested by the plain language of the contract, the context of the contract should be clear and 
obvious.’) For a more general acceptance of the three requirements, see the Singapore High Court 
(Sing HC) decisions of Goh Guan Chong v AspenTech, Inc [2009] 3 SLR(R) 590 (Sing HC) [57] [79]; and 
Sheng Siong Supermarket Pte Ltd v Carilla Pte Ltd [2011] 4 SLR 1094 (Sing HC) [31].
75 Yamashita Tetsuo v See Hup Seng Ltd [2009] 2 SLR(R) 265 (Sing CA) [64].
76 Zurich Insurance (n 40) [127]. 
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of extrinsic material.77 Then if, in the light of this context, the plain language of 
the contract becomes ambiguous (ie, it takes on another plausible meaning) or 
absurd, the court will be entitled to give the contractual term in question an 
interpretation which is different from that demanded by its plain language.78 It 
should be noted that the Court does not locate a substantive interpretative 
approach within the Indian Evidence Act. This second step of the framework, 
therefore, is arguably a transplant of the modern contextual approach. Thus, the 
approach in Zurich Insurance simultaneously recognises the notion that words have 
fixed or plain meanings while also acknowledging that such meanings can be 
departed from to some extent.79 However, the fixed or plain meaning of words 
still constrain the interpreter; if the objectively determined meaning strains that 
meaning unacceptably, then the better approach might be rectification.80 The 
existing canons of interpretation continue to be relevant as well, although they 
are only a guide and not exhaustive.81 
4 Accounting for the Different Approaches: Correlation between 
Contractual and Statutory Interpretation
These three approaches outlined above represent varying degrees to which the 
modern contextual approach has found expression within provisions of the Indian 
Evidence Act. The different approaches may be accounted for by the different (if 
unstated) approaches the various jurisdictions take towards the interpretation of 
statutes, in this case, the Indian Evidence Act. Although statutory interpretation is 
not the focus of this article, some brief reference will be made to it for completeness. 
In this regard, it is important to recognise that the issue of contractual interpretation 
in these jurisdictions involves a prior question of statutory interpretation. The 
modern approach in statutory interpretation, generally speaking, is the ‘purposive’ 
approach. This approach aims to further every aspect of the legislative purpose;82 
as Lord Steyn has said, ‘[o]ne can confidently assume that Parliament intends 
its legislation to be interpreted not in the way of a black-letter lawyer, but in a 
meaningful and purposeful way giving effect to the basic objectives of the 
legislation.’83 In ascertaining the legislative purpose, modern courts can have 
recourse to parliamentary materials, but usually prior to the enactment of the 
statute, for the statute is taken to crystallise the legislative intention. This is similar, 
from a broad perspective, with contractual interpretation, where the aim is likewise 
to ascertain the maker’s intention.
77 Zurich Insurance (n 40) [115–21].
78 Zurich Insurance (n 40) [130]. 
79 Zurich Insurance (n 40) [122].
80 Zurich Insurance (n 40) [123].
81 Zurich Insurance (n 40) [131].
82 Francis Bennion, Bennion on Statutory Interpretation (5th edn, LexisNexis 2008) 943. 
83 Attorney General’s Reference (No 5 of 2002) [2004] UKHL 43, [31] (Steyn LJ). 
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One might argue against the analogy of contractual and statutory interpretation. 
For example, Justice Kirby points out that a distinction between contracts and 
statutes is that a statute has wider ambit, application and longer anticipated 
duration than a contract. This means that statutory words tend to take on a 
broader operation and hence a wider meaning. This in turn makes it inappropriate 
to restrict the meaning of the statutory text to the ‘intentions’ of the original 
drafters.84 Indeed, the very wide application of a statute—usually to society as a 
whole—means that contemporary ideas of justice and fairness may inform the 
interpretation of the statutory text even if it means departing from the original 
intention of its drafters.85 On the other hand, because the time frame of a contract 
is shorter and the focus narrower, it is presumably more appropriate to restrict the 
meaning of the contractual language to what the contracting parties originally 
intended.86 Professor Movsesian alludes to a similar objection. He says that 
contracts bind only the parties who make it whereas statutes do not.87 A statute 
establishes rules for parties other than those who enacted it. He says, therefore, 
that ‘[n]otice to third persons is thus of critical importance”.88 In such 
circumstances, to give priority to the “shared intent of the parties poses the risk 
of substantial hardship’.89
Again, this is an argument on the correct approach to take in interpreting 
contracts and statutes. That is the fundamental question. In the Commonwealth 
context, as with the American approach, if the proper approach is taken to be the 
contextual or purposive approach, then these objections fall away. If the a priori 
question is how one should interpret a document, then the consequences of such 
an approach have no relevance to the former question. In the case of statutory 
interpretation and third parties, one may answer Professor Movsesian in two 
ways. First, as he acknowledged but rejected, legislators might be analogised to 
the agents of people.90 Thus, when enacting decisions, they are actually acting for 
and in place of the people. By this view, there are no third parties. However, it is 
perhaps right to concede that this is a somewhat unrealistic view to take of the 
legislative process.91 A more plausible objection is that the legislative process is 
designed to bind third parties, and the ‘shared intent’ of the legislators is important 
in this respect to determine how third parties are to be bound. This brings us back 
full-circle to the fundamental question: how are we to interpret contracts and 
84 The Hon Justice Michael Kirby, ‘Towards a Grand Theory of Interpretation: The Case of Statutes 
and Contracts’ (2003) 24 Statute Law Review 95, 106.
85 ibid 107.
86 ibid 107.
87 Mark L Movsesian, ‘Are Statutes Really “Legislative Bargains”? The Failure of the Contract 




91 Indeed, how many would say that they accede to everything that legislature enacts, a pre-requisite 
requirement of the view?
32 Contractual Interpretation In Indian Evidence Act Jurisdictions ouclj vol 13 no 1
statutes? If the intentions of their makers are regarded as essential, then the 
consequences of their intentions are not relevant to the anterior question. Professor 
Movsesian’s objections can be rejected simply because they wrongly assume a 
co-relation between consequence and purpose. Thus, while it has variously been 
pointed out that contractual interpretation and statutory interpretation are quite 
different,92 both are actually similar on a broader level. They both concern 
ascertaining the meaning of the document in an objective manner.93 The 
interpretation of the Indian Evidence Act, and its consequential effect on 
contractual interpretation, illustrates the interaction between both types of 
interpretation. 
Following this approach, an overly broad reading of the Indian Evidence Act 
to permit all aspects of the modern contextual approach to contractual 
interpretation may actually represent an unintentional departure from the 
purposive approach to statutory interpretation, particularly when the full extent 
of the modern approach was never considered by the legislature responsible for 
enacting the Indian Evidence Act.94 This is important for, as Aharon Barak puts 
it,95 there is a difference between interpretative and non-interpretative doctrines.96 
Barak states that the authority to alter a text is one which belongs to its author, ie 
Parliament, but not to judicial interpretation. The act of interpretation is the 
giving of a legal text a meaning that its language (explicitly or implicitly) can bear 
and does not involve the express rewriting of the language.97 Interpretation ends 
at the point at which language ends.98 The constitutional framework and the 
separation of powers restrict interpreters from stretching the meaning of statutory 
provisions.99 While there is a legislative mandate to interpret the statutory provision 
in the light of the legislative purpose, section 9A(1) also enjoins the court to 
interpret the written law (or a provision thereof ). This implies the boundaries of 
the statutory language. While language is open to varying degrees of 
interpretation,100 this does not mean that it is infinitely malleable and can be 
 92 See eg Catherine Mitchell, ‘Contract Interpretation: Pragmatism, Principle and the Prior Negotiations 
Rule’ (2010) 26 Journal of Contract Law 134, 148. 
 93 Zurich Insurance (n 40) [133].
 94 See also Bennion (n 82) 890 (emphasis added) (‘An updating construction of an enactment may be 
defined as a construction which takes account of relevant changes which have occurred since the 
enactment was originally framed but does not alter the meaning of its wording in ways which do not fall within 
the principles originally envisaged by that wording.’) Indeed, even though the learned author states that 
considerations of developments in technology can be used by the courts to modify the statutory 
language (a proposition not entirely universally accepted: see Antonin Scalia, A Matter of Interpretation: 
Federal Courts and the Law (Princeton University Press 1998)), he does qualify this statement by saying 
that ‘[i]f however changed technology produces something which is altogether beyond the scope of 
the original enactment, the court will not treat it as covered.’ (Bennion (n 82) 905). 
 95 Aharon Barak, Purposive Interpretation in Law (Princeton University Press 2005).
 96 ibid 14–15.
 97 ibid 18.
 98 ibid 15. 
 99 ibid 20. 
100 ibid 23–24.
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given any meaning.101 Rather than interpreting the Indian Evidence Act 
purposively, a court in such a case would actually be impermissibly rewriting the 
legislation concerned (by ignoring it), while at the same time (ironically) 
advocating a contractual interpretative approach that is loyal to the makers’ 
intention. The interaction between the legislative purpose behind the Indian 
Evidence Act at the time of its enactment and the modern contextual approach 
forms the main criterion for assessing the compatibility of the modern contextual 
approach with the Indian Evidence Act. 
On this premise, the approach that ignores the Indian Evidence Act must be 
rejected at the outset. While there may be an arguable point as to the extent that 
the Act remains relevant, that does not extend to ignoring it completely. So long 
as it remains on the affected jurisdictions’ statute books, it is still an embodiment 
of legislative intent and so must be applied. The question is the extent of such 
application, and that invites an assessment and comparison of the approach 
which follows the Act completely, and that which applies it only partially.
d the coMpAtIBIlIty of the Modern contextuAl ApproAch  
wIth the IndIAn evIdence Act 
1 Does the Indian Evidence Act Contemplate the Modern Contextual 
Approach? 
The first broad aspect of assessment concerns the interpretative approach thought 
to apply under the Indian Evidence Act. While the Indian Evidence Act does not 
outwardly prescribe any substantive contractual interpretative approach,102 
modern courts have read the modern contextual approach into it, particularly via 
proviso 6 of section 92, the ‘exclusion of evidence’ provision. That this is done is 
not by itself incorrect, but this ought not to be mistaken as being driven by the 
modern contextual approach. The interpretation of the Indian Evidence Act, a 
piece of legislation written more than a century before Investors Compensation, 
should not be affected by the latter case and developments thereafter. Thus, while 
a Law Reform Committee formed by the Singapore Academy of Law has stated 
that ‘a broader and more permissive application of [proviso 6] is to be preferred’ 
as ‘[i]t accords with the modern approach to construction of contracts’,103 it is 
submitted that this starts on the wrong premise. As already mentioned, the 
interpretation of contracts in jurisdictions governed by the Indian Evidence Act, 
including Singapore, starts with a prior interpretation of a statute. The 
ascertainment of the legislative intent should be the starting point, rather than 
101 ibid 23–24.
102 Neither does the Indian Contract Act (No 9 of 1872) or its equivalents prescribe an interpretative 
approach. 
103  Singapore Academy of Law (n 16) [125].
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whether a particular mode of contractual interpretation accords with a modern 
development. This is especially since the very purpose of a code is to preserve the 
legislative intent at a particular time subject, of course, to limited flexibility. The 
constitutional framework and the separation of powers restrict interpreters from 
stretching the meaning of statutory provisions.104
A more appropriate starting point is thus to consider the prevailing interpretative 
approach at the time when the Indian Evidence Act was enacted. The Indian 
Evidence Act was, after all, intended to codify the English evidence law of the 
time.105 In this regard, Lord Hoffmann’s speech in Investors Compensation did not, 
perhaps, break any new ground but did re-establish old ones.106 The courts have 
always maintained the legitimacy and importance of interpreting contracts in 
their proper contexts and have been doing so since the 19th century or even 
earlier. At that time, contractual interpretation was largely regarded as ‘liberal’.107 
It was liberal in the sense that the search was for the parties’ true intentions, 
ascertained by consideration of the surrounding facts and circumstances,108 as 
opposed to adhering to the strict literal sense of contractual terms.109 Thus, the 
Indian Evidence Act was probably not intended to supersede the contextual 
interpretative approach. Just as the contextual approach continued to be 
advocated by the courts of that time despite the restrictive rules governing the 
admissible background information, so too can the contextual approach exist 
simultaneously with the Indian Evidence Act. While it is true that the common 
law parole evidence rule and the Indian Evidence Act both restricted the 
background information available to the interpreting party, these restrictions did 
not render the contextual approach inapplicable since some context was still made 
available. What resulted was a weaker implementation of the contextual approach: 
one that denies the full range of background information normally available and 
adheres to certain default positions concerning the plain meaning of words as the 
criterion for admissibility. This demonstrates the interaction between the question 
of admissible evidence and the question of the substantive interpretation approach. 
However, the weaker implementation of the contextual approach did not militate 
104 Barak (n 95) 20. Also, ‘[p]urposive construction often requires a sophisticated analysis to determine 
the legislative purpose and a discriminating judgment as to where the boundary of construction ends 
and legislation begins.’ (Kingston v Keprose Pty Ltd (1987) 11 NSWLR 404 (NSW CA) 423 (McHugh JA)). 
See also E W Thomas, ‘The Relationship of Parliament and the Courts: A Tentative Thought or Two 
for the New Millennium’ (2000) 31 Victoria University of Wellington Law Review 5.
105 See Stephen (n 17) 2. Cf Balkishen Dass (n 5) [10] (‘The cases in the English Court of Chancery which 
were referred to by the learned judges in the High Court have not, in the opinion of their Lordships, 
any application to the law of India as laid down in the Acts of the Indian Legislature.’).
106 McMeel (n 10) 162.
107 Samuel Comyn, A Treatise of the Law Relative to Contracts and Agreements Not Under Seal (A Strahan, 1807) 
532.
108 Shore v Wilson (n 36) 521, 534–536.
109 H T Colebrooke, Treatise on Obligations and Contracts (Black, Kingsbury, Parbury, and Allen, Leadenhall-
Street 1818) 65.
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against the adoption of some form of contextual approach. Therefore, the acceptance 
of such an approach is not prima facie wrong.
The quite separate (and important) question now is the extent to which the 
contextual approach applies pursuant to the Indian Evidence Act. We start with 
the arguable companion to the Indian Evidence Act, viz, Stephen’s Digest. In 
contrast with the Indian Evidence Act, Stephen’s Digest contained substantive 
rules. For example, notwithstanding its stated purpose as concerning ‘what 
evidence may be given for the interpretation of documents’, Article 91 contains 
certain rules that govern how to interpret a document. Specifically, Article 91(1) 
provides that: ‘(1) Putting a construction upon a document means ascertaining 
the meaning of the signs or words made upon it, and their relation to facts.’ Two 
points flow from the inclusion of substantive interpretation rules in the Digest, 
which were excluded from the Indian Evidence Act. The first is that the exclusion 
of an interpretative approach in the Act may be taken as a deliberate departure 
from the inclusion of such in the Digest. As such, at least a prima facie case may be 
made to the effect that the Indian Evidence Act does not preclude the modern 
contextual approach, elements of which found expression before the 20th century.
Second, Article 91(1) is significant as it subtly encapsulates an interpretative 
approach that is quite unlike the modern contextual approach. The key corollary 
of the modern contextual approach was that it focused on the meaning of the words 
used in the document. Article 91(1)—and indeed other sections of the Article—
reflects this approach. Stephen makes repeated reference to the ‘meaning of the 
signs or words’ of a document. The Indian Evidence Act, in contrast, employs 
almost exclusively the different phrase ‘the language used in a document’ in the 
equivalent (or similar) provisions. ‘Language used’ may not preclude the modern 
contextual approach as it is an express departure from the meaning of the signs or 
words. Rather than be dictated by the inherent meanings of signs and words, 
‘language’ at least suggests a departure from this stance, or even an adoption of a 
more context based approach.
However, it does not follow that because the Indian Evidence Act does not 
preclude the modern contextual approach that such an approach can be fully 
implemented. The question is how much of the context can be referred to. While 
this is a separate question from the interpretative approach to be taken, its relation 
to the approach is quite important. Indeed, at the most, we have seen thus far that 
the Indian Evidence Act allows recourse to the context via proviso 6 of section 92. 
To that extent, it indirectly supports a contextual approach. However, the 
application of a contextual approach merely connotes that the context should be 
looked at in the interpretation process; it does not tell us the extent to which the 
context may be looked at. Indeed, with Investors Compensation, the model of 
contextual approach may be regarded as having shifted away from the weak 
version preserved under the Indian Evidence Act. The stronger version posits 
that words are inherently open-textured and can take on a variety of different 
meanings depending on the context in which the contract concerned was made. 
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To cater for this open-textured nature of words, the extrinsic evidence admissible 
is purposely made very broad, subject to the exceptions against the admissibility 
of prior negotiations and subsequent conduct. This forms a possible difference 
between the modern contextual approach and the Indian Evidence Act, which 
we explore in the next section.
2 The Plain Meaning or Plain Application Rule?
It is precisely because of this potential difference that it would be wrong to suppose 
straightaway that the full extent of the modern contextual approach could be 
transplanted into the Indian Evidence Act. One reason against such transplantation 
may be that the Indian Evidence Act subscribes to the notion that words have 
certain fixed or plain meanings to them. This is the argument we consider now.
It is perhaps not wrong to say that the Indian Evidence Act contemplates that 
words have fixed or plain meanings to them. Consider for example section 94, 
which provides that: ‘When language used in a document is plain in itself and 
when it applies accurately to existing facts, evidence may not be given to show 
that it was not meant to apply to such facts.’ This clearly contemplates that 
language used in a document can be ‘plain’. However, this may not translate into 
a plain meaning rule, that is, words are to be given their plain meanings. Under 
this rule, evidence is not admissible to contradict the otherwise plain meaning of 
a contractual provision. This would have been consistent with the prevailing 
common law of the time. For example, Lord Halsbury in North E Ry Co v Hastings110 
said that words of a written instrument must be construed according to their 
natural meaning and this principle is universally insisted upon.111 Indeed Article 
91(2) of Stephen’s Digest contains a plain meaning rule. It provides that: 
‘[E]vidence may not be given to show that common words, the meaning of which 
is plain, and which do not appear from the context to have been used in a peculiar 
sense, were in fact so used.’
This is the classic formulation of the plain meaning provision. It is, however, 
absent from the Indian Evidence Act. Section 94, which is reproduced above, is 
its closest counterpart. However, it does not does not deal predominantly with the 
meaning of words at all, but only with their application. This suggests that the 
Indian Evidence Act did not intend to encapsulate a plain meaning rule. In a 
related vein, one further argument in support of this may be the express departure 
from the ‘meaning of signs or words’ formulation in the Digest. It may be argued 
that this departure, and the shift to emphasise on the ‘language’ used, means that 
the Indian Evidence Act does not subscribe to the notion that words have certain 
fixed or plain meanings that will always be insisted on. This militates against a 
plain meaning rule within the Indian Evidence Act. 
110 (1900) AC 260, 263 (Halsbury LC). 
111 See also Gibson v Minet (1791) 1 H Bl 569, 616; 126 ER 326, 352; Shore v Wilson (n 36) 485–487; 436–
443. 
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Moreover, in Wigram’s work on the admissibility of extrinsic evidence in the 
interpretation of wills—which Stephen said he was heavily influenced by in 
formulating Article 91 of his Digest—the notion that the plain meaning of words 
is not absolute finds expression in his first three Propositions, all of which 
correspond to various provisions in the Indian Evidence Act.112 By Proposition 1, 
a testator is always presumed to use the words in which he expresses himself, 
according to their strict and primary acceptance unless otherwise contradicted from the 
context of the will.113 By Proposition 2, the plain meaning of words should be applied 
if such meaning is sensible with reference to extrinsic circumstances.114 And finally, by 
Proposition 3, the plain meaning of words can be departed from when such meaning 
is insensible with reference to extrinsic circumstances.115 Proposition 2 is reflected in 
section 94 of the Indian Evidence Act, and Proposition 3 clearly influenced 
section 95. These Propositions likewise subscribed to the notion that words have 
plain or fixed meanings, but they also contemplated that such meanings can be 
departed from if the application of such words reveals otherwise.
It is also useful to compare the language of section 94 of the Indian Evidence 
Act with Article 91(6) of Stephen’s Digest, its closest equivalent. This Article 
provides as follows: ‘(6) If the document has one distinct meaning in reference to 
surrounding circumstances, it must be construed accordingly, and evidence to 
show that the author intended to express some other meaning is not admissible.’
The phrase ‘it must be construed accordingly’ is missing in the Indian Evidence 
Act and this is surely an extremely significant omission. A comparison between 
the respective illustrations shows the impact of the change. The illustration to 
section 94 states that A has an estate at Rampur containing 100 bighas, and A 
indeed has such an estate. In such a case, evidence may not be given of the fact 
that the estate meant some other one at a different place and of a different size. 
In contrast, in Miller v Travers, of which the illustration to Article 91(6) is based, 
evidence was held inadmissible to render reference to the ‘county of Limerick’ as 
really being to the ‘county of Clare’. However, it is significant that the illustration 
contemplates, as do the facts of Miller v Travers, that there are no estates in the 
country of Limerick. In other words, what the illustration was concerned about 
was the plain meaning of the words without care of its application. If the same 
facts were applied to the Indian Evidence Act, it is conceivable that sections 94 
and 95 would operate in tandem to allow for the admission of extrinsic evidence 
to show that reference to the ‘county of Limerick’ was really to the ‘county of 
Clare’ since the application of the words ‘county of Limerick’ would be ‘unmeaning 
in reference to existing facts’.
112 Stephen (n 17) 160–161. It has been noted that the provisions in the Indian Evidence Act concerning 
the interpretation of contracts correspond to various propositions in Wigram’s work: see Sarkar and 
Manohar (n 22) 1573.
113 Wigram (n 29) 13. 
114 Wigram (n 29) 15.
115 Wigram (n 29) 29.
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Therefore, the added qualification in the illustration that the estate did exist, 
read together with the added language in the substantive provision on existing 
facts, would seem to represent a significant toning down of the rule in Miller v 
Travers, which makes it much more compatible with the modern contextual 
approach. The result must be that the Indian Evidence Act does not enshrine the 
plain meaning rule as the Digest does. However, it does proceed on the basis that 
words have fixed meanings; the difference is that it, however, does not insist on 
such meanings unless it can be shown that the application of that meaning to 
existing facts would give rise to an inaccuracy or an ambiguity. The Indian 
Evidence Act can thus at the very best be said to contain a plain application rule in 
section 94.
Viewed this way, there may not be a material distinction between the Indian 
Evidence Act and the modern contextual approach. It is true that in Investors 
Compensation, Lord Hoffmann said that ‘[t]he meaning which a document (or any 
other utterance) would convey to a reasonable man is not the same thing as the 
meaning of its words.’116 According to Lord Hoffmann, the meaning of words is 
the matter of dictionaries and grammar; this is a reference to the notion that 
words have fixed or plain meanings which do not change with the context, and 
which is not followed under the modern approach. Instead, the modern contextual 
approach takes it that words do not have such plain meanings and are susceptible 
to a variety of meanings, even to the extent that there is an outright departure 
from the fixed meaning of the word used. The rationale for this is that the courts 
‘do not easily accept that people have made linguistic mistakes, particularly 
in formal documents’.117 Indeed, an eminent commentator has described the 
modern approach as having abandoned the plain meaning rule in favour of an 
inference—which may be displaced by the context—that words are used in their 
natural, ordinary or common signification.118 The Indian Evidence Act, whilst 
presupposing that words have plain meanings, insist that the application be 
incorrect before allowing for correction. There is limited fidelity to the plain 
meaning of the words. If this description is correct, then there is no real difference 
between the Indian Evidence Act and the modern contextual approach. The 
notion that words have plain or fixed meanings is subscribed to by both 
approaches, but it is also acknowledged that it can be departed from where the 
context requires it.
3 Limited Admissibility of Extrinsic Evidence?
We have so far concluded that there is no plain meaning rule in the Indian 
Evidence Act. At the most, it has a plain application rule that, while paying 
116 Investors Compensation (n 1) 913 (Lord Hoffmann).
117 Investors Compensation (n 1) 913 (Lord Hoffmann).
118 D W MacLauchlan, ‘Contract Formation, Contract Interpretation and Subsequent Conduct’ 
(2006) 25 Queensland Law Journal 77, 92.
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fidelity to the plain meaning of words, allows for departure from such meaning 
where the context reveals an inaccuracy or ambiguity. However, we are still faced 
with some provisions of the Indian Evidence Act that seemingly restrict the 
admissible evidence to interpret contracts. In other words, we are still left with 
the question of whether various aspects of admissibility limit the application of 
the modern contextual approach.
(a) Facts That May be Proved
We start first with the fundamental question of which facts are relevant (and 
hence provable). Consider, as a starting point, the ‘state of things’ provision in 
section 7 and the ‘supporting inferences’ provision of section 9 of the Indian 
Evidence Act, which are set out below:
7 Facts which are the occasion, cause, or effect, immediate or otherwise, or relevant 
facts, or facts in issue, or which constitute the state of things under which they happened, 
or which afforded an opportunity for their occurrence or transaction, are relevant.
9 Facts necessary to explain or introduce a fact in issue or relevant fact, or which sup-
port or rebut an inference suggested by a fact in issue, or relevant fact, or which establish 
the identity of any thing or person whose identity is relevant, or fix the time or place at 
which any fact in issue or relevant fact happened, or which show the relation of parties 
by whom any such fact was transacted, are relevant in so far as they are necessary for 
that purpose.
These appear to be prima facie wide enough to make the ‘factual matrix’—the 
focus of the modern contextual approach relevant—and hence provable under 
the Indian Evidence Act. In fact, illustration (a) to section 9, which provides that 
the state of A’s property and of his family at the date of alleged will may be 
relevant facts to ascertain whether a given document is the will of A. This seems 
at least analogous to the relevant background information in contractual 
interpretation. The only way in which this might not be so is if they were expressly 
excluded by virtue of some other provision. Obviously, this does not mean that 
everything and anything is admissible. The general provision of section 5—that 
evidence can only be given of facts in issue or relevant facts and of nothing else—
continues to control. The result is that relevance continues to be important, but 
that one has to fall back upon the very general test of relevance set out in Part I 
in deciding what facts a party can be allowed to prove, and what facts a party 
cannot. 
Some courts have gone a step further and read other requirements before facts 
may be proved into the Indian Evidence Act without referring to the relevancy 
provisions under Part I of the Indian Evidence Act. For example, the Singapore 
Court of Appeal in Zurich Insurance imposed the requirements of relevancy, 
reasonable availability and clear and obvious context before extrinsic evidence 
was admitted to interpret a contract. It seems that the Court was concerned with 
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the facts that may be proved, as opposed to the evidence that may be adduced to 
prove those facts. 
If this is correct, it is submitted that the Indian Evidence Act does not outwardly 
support these requirements. First, it is not possible to overtly locate the basis of 
these requirements within the Indian Evidence Act. Turning to the requirement 
of relevancy, the usage of ‘relevance’ in Zurich Insurance is apparently not the 
technical sense prescribed by Part I of the Indian Evidence Act. In particular, and 
as already mentioned, the Indian Evidence Act enacts that ‘[o]ne fact is said to 
be relevant to another when the one is connected with the other in any of the ways 
referred to in the provisions of this Act relating to the relevancy of facts’. Thirteen 
sections of the same Act lay down the situations in which facts are ‘relevant’, and 
no more.119 
The second requirement of ‘reasonable availability’ is likewise not expressly 
provided for in the Indian Evidence Act and is derived from Investors Compensation. 
Although Lord Hoffmann in Investors Compensation phrased the ‘reasonable 
availability’ requirement as a distinct requirement,120 its underlying rationale is 
still tied to that of the modern usage of ‘relevance’. In Codelfa Construction Pty Ltd v 
State Rail Authority of New South Wales,121 Brennan J said that ‘an extrinsic fact 
known only to one of the contracting parties can shed no light upon the meaning 
with which that word or phrase was used by the other or others’.122 There is thus 
a presumption—a seemingly irrebuttable one—that extrinsic evidence which is 
not available to both contracting parties would not assist in the reasonable man’s 
understanding of the contractual term and, hence, not be ‘relevant’. The inquiry 
revolves around the fundamental question of whether the reasonable man would 
derive assistance or help from the extrinsic evidence concerned, and the 
requirement of ‘reasonable availability’ is simply a specific facet of this broader 
inquiry, which is not provided for in the Indian Evidence Act.
The third requirement of a ‘clear and obvious context’ may also be cast in the 
same light. On the basis of promoting certainty, the Singapore Court of Appeal 
in Zurich Insurance imposed a threshold requirement of a ‘clear and obvious 
context’ before extrinsic evidence can be admitted. The Singapore High Court 
has explained in a later case that this means that the extrinsic evidence that is 
tendered before the court must point to a clear or obvious context before the court 
can say with any certainty that such evidence is of assistance to the court. 
According to the Court, this makes logical sense because if the extrinsic evidence 
points to a context that is far from clear or obvious, the court would be acting 
within the realm of speculation.123 On this reading, this requirement of a ‘clear 
119 See Lee Chez Kee v PP [2008] 3 SLR(R) 447 (Sing CA) [69].
120 Investors Compensation (n 1) 912–13.
121 (1982) 149 CLR 337.
122 Codelfa Construction Pty Ltd v State Rail Authority of New South Wales (1982) 149 CLR 337 (Aust HC) 401 
(Brennan J).
123 Tiger Airways Pty Ltd v Swissport Singapore Pte Ltd [2009] 4 SLR(R) 992 (Sing HC) [22].
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and obvious’ context is simply an elaboration of the relevance test discussed 
earlier. Where extrinsic evidence is unclear, it will also be generally unhelpful to 
the reasonable man’s understanding of the contractual terms, thereby failing the 
requirement of ‘relevance’. Likewise, this is not provided for in the Indian 
Evidence Act.
Therefore, the three requirements of relevance, reasonable availability, and 
clear and obvious context are really three sides of the same question, premised on 
the concept of ‘relevance’ as explained in Investors Compensation. While possibly 
justifiable on pragmatic grounds, the better view is that these requirements can 
find an anchor in the relevancy provisions, either section 7 or 9, of the Indian 
Evidence Act. These sections are conceivably wide enough to accommodate these 
requirements. 
(b) Need for Ambiguity Before Extrinsic Evidence Admissible?
It is clear therefore that various provisions of Part I of the Indian Evidence Act 
allow a wide context to be provable. Moreover, the reading of a plain application 
rule into the Indian Evidence Act means that the admissibility of extrinsic 
evidence is not dictated by a prior need for ambiguity, as insisted by the Indian 
cases. This is the position under the modern contextual approach.124 Yet, the 
Indian cases are also correct in insisting on the need for ambiguity before extrinsic 
evidence can be admitted for the purpose of explaining the words concerned. 
The key is to recognise that extrinsic evidence may be admissible for several 
purposes, and the criterion of ambiguity applies to restrict admissibility for a 
specific purpose only. 
On its face, the Indian Evidence Act provides for a limited admissibility of 
extrinsic evidence in the interpretative exercise based on the criterion of 
ambiguity. If this is in fact true, this would be in contrast to the modern contextual 
approach, which imposes fewer boundaries on the admissible evidence. As Lord 
Hoffmann said in Investors Compensation: 
Subject to the requirement that it should have been reasonably available to the parties 
and to the exception to be mentioned next, it includes absolutely anything which would 
have affected the way in which the language of the document would have been under-
stood by a reasonable man.125
Although Lord Hoffmann qualified the ambit of this statement in a later case,126 
the fact remains that the modern contextual approach allows for a greater range 
of admissible evidence than the Indian Evidence Act when it comes to the 
interpretation of contracts. Some courts, such as the Singapore Court of Appeal, 
124 See, eg, Investors Compensation (n 1); Westminster City Council v National Asylum Support Services [2002] 
UKHL 38 (HL) [5].
125 Investors Compensation (n 1) 912–13 (Lord Hoffmann).
126 See Bank of Credit and Commerce International SA v Ali [2001] UKHL 8 [39] (Lord Hoffmann).
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have dismissed the requirement of ambiguity before extrinsic evidence can be 
admitted. The question is whether this is permissible under the terms of the 
Indian Evidence Act. 
The Indian Evidence Act specifically restricts the range of admissible evidence 
primarily by recourse to the distinction between latent and patent ambiguities. 
The distinction between these two types of ambiguities originated from Lord 
Bacon’s Maxims.127 Although those Maxims were originally formulated for 
pleadings, they have attained substantive effects of their own on the basis that ‘a 
transaction of one “nature” cannot be overturned by anything of an inferior 
“nature”’.128 While once also a restriction of the admissible evidence under the 
common law, that distinction has largely been done away with in the present 
time.129 The result is that the ambiguities restrict the range of admissible evidence 
under the Indian Evidence Act,130 although only for the specific purpose of 
explaining words. This is very clear on the face of the relevant provisions: for 
example, section 94 refers to extrinsic evidence being used to show that the words 
were ‘not meant to apply to such [existing] facts’. Likewise, section 95, the first of 
the ‘latent ambiguity’ provisions, allows for extrinsic evidence to be ‘given to 
show that it was used in a peculiar sense’. The common purpose contemplated is 
the use of extrinsic evidence to explain the words concerned. Nowhere in the 
Indian Evidence Act is there a prohibition against the admissibility of extrinsic 
evidence to establish whether there is an ambiguity in the first place. This is also 
consistent with the prevailing law—that extrinsic evidence is always admissible 
to raise a latent ambiguity—at the time the Indian Evidence Act was enacted.131 
Therefore, it is necessary to be clear what the purpose for admitting extrinsic 
evidence is. The contractual interpretative exercise is a composite one, in which 
extrinsic evidence may be used for different purposes. More specifically, extrinsic 
evidence may be admitted to establish whether there is an ambiguity; a pre-
interpretative exercise that establishes negatively what the word cannot mean, 
but does not yet establish positively the meaning of the word. This is a subtle but 
important distinction that is necessarily implied in the various provisions of the 
Indian Evidence Act that contemplate either patent or latent ambiguity. Indeed, 
without recourse to such evidence, it is not possible to ascertain whether there is 
127 Francis Bacon, A Collection of Some Principal Rules and Maximes of the Common Lawes of England (1630) 72.
128 J H Wigmore, Wigmore on Evidence: A Treatise on the Anglo-American System of Evidence in Trials at Common 
Law (Chadbourn Revision), vol 9 (3rd edn, Little Brown and Company, 1940) 88.
129 Maybe even earlier: see eg Colpoys v Colpoys (1822) Jacob 451, 463; 37 ER 921, 925. See also L Schuler 
AG v Wickman Machine Tool Sales Ltd [1974] AC 235 (HL) 268, ‘[T]he distinctions between patent 
ambiguities, latent ambiguities and equivocations as regards admissibility of extrinsic evidence are 
based on outmoded and highly technical and artificial rules and introduce absurd refinements.’
130 See, eg, F M Morgan, ‘Extrinsic Evidence in the Evidence of Wills’ (1860) 2 Juridical Society Papers 
351, 378, in which the author noted that Lord Bacon’s maxim was not intended to be a complete 
dissertation upon the use of extrinsic evidence in the juridical interpretation of legal instruments, 
and it was a maxim relating to pleadings, not to evidence. See also Seng (n 35) 485.
131 See, eg, Thomas v Thomas (1796) 6 TR 671, 101 ER 764.
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ambiguity in the first place. However, the type of ambiguity determined then 
restricts the use of extrinsic evidence to supply a different meaning than the plain 
meaning, if the application of the plain meaning results in an ambiguity. Thus, 
the Indian courts’ lack of distinction between these specific uses of extrinsic 
evidence may require reconsideration. The truth is that when the Indian courts 
rule that there is ambiguity (or not), they have already implicitly considered 
extrinsic evidence, although not (yet) for the purpose of explaining the contractual 
words (in a positive sense). This distinction is, in contrast, acknowledged by the 
integrated approach of the Singapore Court of Appeal. The Singapore approach 
is to recognise that ambiguity plays no role in limiting the extrinsic evidence in 
establishing whether there is an ambiguity in the first place. However, ambiguity 
plays a role in restricting the use of extrinsic evidence in departing from the plain 
meaning (where the application of such plain meaning results in an ambiguity) of 
the words: in the absence of ambiguity after considering the extrinsic evidence, 
the evidence cannot be used to positively ascribe a meaning to the word that is 
different from its plain meaning. It is suggested that such an approach is compatible 
with the original legislative purpose behind the Indian Evidence Act, and is to be 
encouraged. 
(c) Prior Negotiations and Subsequent Conduct?
A specific issue concerns the admissibility of prior negotiations and subsequent 
conduct under the Indian Evidence Act. The admissibility of evidence under the 
modern contextual approach is subject to two prominent exceptions: both prior 
negotiations and subsequent conduct cannot be admitted to interpret the contract. 
According to Lord Hoffmann in Investors Compensation, ‘[t]he law makes this 
distinction for reasons of practical policy and, in this respect only, legal 
interpretation differs from the way we would interpret utterances in ordinary 
life.’132 While the ambits of these exceptions have been reduced in recent times, 
they still block out a range of evidence that may be relevant in the interpretative 
exercise. The Indian Evidence Act, on the other hand, does not overtly prohibit 
recourse to such evidence. Instead, it potentially blocks out such evidence due to 
the distinction it draws between latent and patent ambiguities. Indeed, this 
was the position taken by the common law in the 19th century until certain cases 
at the turn of the 20th century, such as Inglis v John Buttery Co,133 established the 
currency of an independent rule which excludes the recourse to prior negotiations 
and subsequent conduct—a rule that has remained to the present day despite its 
questionable historical lineage. On the express words of the Indian Evidence Act 
at least, no special exclusion is allocated towards prior negotiations or subsequent 
132 Investors Compensation (n 1) 913 (Lord Hoffmann).
133 (1878) 3 App Cas 552 (HL).
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conduct: both may be admissible to interpret the contract provided that they do 
not infringe the rules pertaining to latent or patent ambiguities. However, the 
courts applying the Indian Evidence Act still adopt the common law exclusionary 
rule against both types of extrinsic evidence, regardless of whether the contractual 
language is ambiguous or not.134 
This may require reconsideration as being a matter not contemplated by the 
Indian Evidence Act. In this regard, it is important that the Indian Evidence Act 
has provided for the instances where extrinsic evidence (which can include prior 
negotiations) may (or may not) be admitted for the interpretation of a contract in 
sections 94 to 100 on a particular basis. A common law development that justifies 
exclusion of prior negotiations on a different basis would be inconsistent. This 
argument is strengthened when one considers that prior negotiations were not 
treated apart from other types of evidence at the time the Evidence Act was 
enacted. Indeed, prior negotiations were in fact admissible to ascertain the aim 
and object of the contract as early as in 1835. In Reay v Richardson,135 a previous 
conversation was held admissible to explain the motive that induced the plaintiff 
to enter into a compromise agreement with the defendant. Parke B held that the 
evidence of the conversation was not to add to or qualify the terms of the 
agreement, but to show with what view the agreement was written.136 Prior 
negotiations were only excluded on the principle that ‘it is not permitted to 
interpret what has no need of interpretation’.137 This rested upon the belief that 
words have fixed meanings, such that a party who has used clear and unambiguous 
language will be held to all that naturally follows from a direct and plain 
understanding of such language.138 It was only when a term was susceptible to 
several meanings139 that recourse could be had to the relevant context in order to 
discover the parties’ true intentions.140 The criterion, it bears repeating, used to 
be that of ‘ambiguity’ to determine whether extrinsic evidence of any kind can be 
admitted to interpret contracts. Since the Indian Evidence Act141 was intended to 
codify the English evidence law at that time,142 it is likely that Stephen, the 
draftsman, intended to import these common law principles into the Act. If so, 
the recognition of the exclusionary rule, based as it is on a different rationale for 
excluding prior negotiations, would be inconsistent with the Indian Evidence Act 
and must be rejected pursuant to section 2(2) of the same Act. This is because the 
134 Eg, Belapur (n 29) [23]; Zurich Insurance (n 41) [132].
135 (1835) 2 C M & R 421; 150 ER 182.
136 (1835) 2 C M & R 421, 426; 150 ER 182, 184.
137 H T Colebrooke, Treatise on Obligations and Contracts (Black, Kingsbury, Parbury, and Allen, 
Leadenhall-Street 1818) 66.
138 ibid; Joseph Chitty, A Practical Treatise on the Law of Contracts Not Under Seal and upon the Usual Defences 
of Actions thereon (Sweet Chancery Lane 1826) 20, citing 5 Vin Ab 510, 4 East 136.
139 Smith v Jeffryes (1846) 15 M. & W. 561, 562; 153 ER 972, 972–973. 
140 Colebrooke (n 137) 67. 
141 More specifically, the Indian Evidence Act: see Heydon, (n 2) 1–2.
142 See Stephen (n 17) 2. 
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exclusionary rule is inconsistent with the rationale of the Indian Evidence Act, 
which provides for when extrinsic evidence may be admissible based on the 
criterion of ‘ambiguity’. While the Act may be non-exhaustive, the very idea of 
separating prior negotiations as a species of evidence to be treated differently is 
inconsistent with the central criterion of ‘ambiguity’ that governs admissibility for 
all extrinsic evidence. This is not a situation involving the common law filling in 
a lacuna in the Indian Evidence Act; rather, the Indian Evidence Act has provided 
an approach that the exclusionary rule is inconsistent with. Therefore, it is 
submitted that, on this basis alone and pursuant to section 2(2) of the Indian 
Evidence Act, the exclusionary rule should not be adopted in jurisdictions with 
the Indian Evidence Act. 
4 Isolating Areas of Compatibility
From the above analysis, it is clear that both the Indian Evidence Act and the 
modern contextual approach share a concern for context. That is a significant 
starting point which, however, gives rise to various differences. First, the degree 
to which they are so concerned is different. The admissible background 
information for the purpose of explaining the contractual language in the Indian 
Evidence Act, centred on the criterion of ‘ambiguity’, is narrower than the 
modern contextual approach, with the result that the ‘context’ for the purposes 
of the Indian Evidence Act is potentially narrower. The admissibility criterion 
for interpreting words under the Indian Evidence Act is that of ambiguity, 
although extrinsic evidence is admissible to establish ambiguity. In contrast, the 
modern contextual approach has no such narrow limitation. Nonetheless, 
‘ambiguity’ is a flexible concept, and has been so interpreted by modern 
Commonwealth courts. The reality is that Commonwealth courts have been all 
too willing to admit extrinsic evidence, and are very ready to find the requisite 
‘ambiguity’ before evidence can be admitted. Thus analysed, the compatibility 
between the Indian Evidence Act and the modern contextual approach may 
thus not be all too stark.
e the wAy forwArd
1 Is There a Problem with Retaining the Status Quo? 
In assessing the way forward, one question that might be asked is whether there 
is any problem with retaining the approach taken in the Indian Evidence Act. 
While many courts in jurisdictions governed by the Indian Evidence Act have 
adopted the modern contextual approach, one might perhaps ask if adherence to 
the Evidence Act is indeed inferior to pushing on toward the adoption of the 
modern contextual approach. 
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(a) Advantage of the Modern Contextual Approach?
One apparent advantage of the modern contextual approach is that it dismisses the 
distinction between patent and latent ambiguities, which has been largely 
discredited. This affords the courts more flexibility in admitting extrinsic evidence 
to interpret the contract,143 rather than allowing extrinsic evidence freely only when 
establishing whether there is an ambiguity in the first place. However, according to 
one commentator,144 the modern contextual approach has seen a retreat of late 
following the decision of the UK Supreme Court in Rainy Sky v Kookmin Bank.145 
Lord Clarke in that case had stated that ‘[w]here the parties have used unambiguous 
language, the court must apply it’.146 This seems to impose a criterion of ambiguity 
before the plain meaning of the contractual words can be departed from. Taken a 
step further, this may also restrict the range of admissible evidence to interpret the 
contract unless there is ambiguity. If this reading of Rainy Sky is correct, there is not 
much difference between the prevailing modern contextual approach and the 
Indian Evidence Act. There may therefore not be as strong an advantage in the 
modern contextual approach over the Indian Evidence Act.
(b) Advantage of the Indian Evidence Act
In fact, an advantage of the Indian Evidence Act is that it provides a principled 
basis for distinguishing classes of evidence, principally prior negotiations and 
subsequent conduct. One might disagree with the use of ambiguity as a criterion, 
but that is at least a basis. This is in contrast with the modern contextual approach 
that differentiates prior negotiations and subsequent conduct on questionable and 
unclear justifications, and excludes them from consideration. As has been pointed 
out,147 the Indian Evidence Act does not differentiate between prior negotiations, 
subsequent conduct and other forms of extrinsic evidence. This is mainly 
historical: the criterion governing admissibility was the presence of latent 
ambiguity, and prior negotiations were only excluded if there was no latent 
ambiguity. Putting aside the idea of latent ambiguity, this approach has much to 
commend about it. There is in reality no fundamental distinction between prior 
negotiations and other types of extrinsic evidence such as to justify a substantive 
rule barring the admission of prior negotiations exclusively. It is little wonder that 
the boundaries of the supposed exclusionary rule against prior negotiations have 
been acknowledged to be unclear by the highest authorities.148
143 Cf A Berg, ‘Thrashing Through the Undergrowth’ (2006) 122 Law Quarterly Review 354.
144 Paul Davies, ‘Interpreting Commercial Contracts: A Case of Ambiguity?’ [2012] Lloyd’s Maritime 
and Commercial Law Quarterly 26, 27.
145 [2011] UKSC 50.
146 ibid [23] (Clarke SCJ).
147 Rajah (n 6) [19].
148 Investors Compensation (n 1) 913 (Lord Hoffmann).
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2 Limited Reform Needed
Compared thus, it is suggested that the Indian Evidence Act is actually closer to 
the modern contextual approach than one might think. The main difference 
is the criterion of ambiguity, which restricts the extrinsic evidence admissible for 
the specific purpose of interpretation, but even that may be narrowing. Thus, the 
integrated approach used by the Singapore Court of Appeal, subject to one 
caveat, may actually be the best way of balancing the concerns of history (within 
the Indian Evidence Act) and the requirements of the modern commercial reality. 
One way out is simply to read the ambiguity provisions widely; while the idea of 
ambiguity is embedded within the Indian Evidence Act and should be respected, 
the degree of ambiguity is not and should remain a flexible concept even a century 
after the passage of the Act. Indeed, the degree of ambiguity required is not 
specified in the Act. This is similar to the approach in Australia following Codelfa 
Construction Pty Ltd v State Rail Authority of New South Wales,149 in which Mason J 
required the identification of ambiguity before extrinsic evidence could be taken 
into account in interpreting a contract. However, subsequent courts have been 
‘generally quite generous’150 in finding that the words of a contract ‘are ambiguous 
or susceptible of more than one meaning’. This therefore allows for the easier 
admission of extrinsic evidence to interpret the contract. 
Thus, a flexible reading of ambiguity—perhaps requiring a lesser degree of 
such—may actually afford the courts a lower threshold to cross before being able 
to depart from the plain meaning of the contractual words concerned. Such an 
approach, if adopted, effectively means that the Indian Evidence Act jurisdictions 
can first consider extrinsic evidence in determining if there is ambiguity, and then 
depart from the plain meaning of the words with just a slight hint of ambiguity 
(where application of the plain meaning gives rise to such ambiguity). This 
ensures that the courts will not be unduly bound to the so-called plain meaning 
of the words devoid of their proper context. It bears repeating that such an 
approach is not founded on a ‘liberal’ reading of the Indian Evidence Act. To the 
contrary, such an approach accords with the original legislative intent behind the 
Act and yet also (as a coincidental point) affords some (but not total) adherence to 
the modern contextual approach. 
Nonetheless, if reform is needed, it is submitted that any reform cannot be 
premised on a ‘liberal’ interpretation of the Indian Evidence Act. There is no real 
149 (1982) 149 CLR 337 (Aust HC) 401. Writing extra-judicially, Mason J said that while the clear 
words of a contract should not be displaced by extrinsic evidence, ambiguity may ‘not be a sufficient 
gateway’ for the admission of extrinsic evidence, and that the gateway ‘should be wide enough to 
admit extrindic evidence which is capable of influencing the meaning of the words of the contract’: 
A Mason, ‘Opening Address’ (2009) 25 Journal of Contract Law 1, 3.
150 Sir Kim Lewison and David Hughes, The Interpretation of Contracts in Australia (Lawbook Co 2012) 
113. It should also be noted that the Australian courts may be departing from the position adopted 
in Codelfa, ibid 114.
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distinction between a ‘liberal’ and an ‘illiberal’ interpretation; the only question, 
according to the theory of statutory interpretation prevalent in the Commonwealth, 
is whether an interpretation furthers the intention of Parliament, which in turn is 
generally regarded as having been preserved at the time of enactment of the Act 
concerned. A ‘liberal’ interpretation of the Indian Evidence Act runs the risk of 
judicially interpreting the law to mean what Parliament never intended to do (and 
still has not done). By its very nature, and taking into account its historical origins, 
the Indian Evidence Act is incapable of sustaining the entire modern contextual 
approach. The result is that jurisdictions governed by that Act cannot import the 
entire modern approach. Any legislative reform should amend the Indian 
Evidence Act to delete the specific provisions concerning latent and patent 
ambiguity. And, further, what is really required here is that proviso 6 to the 
‘exclusion of oral evidence’ provision be elevated to an independent provision of 
its own, thereby providing clear legislative intent that the contextual approach is 
to apply, and that ambiguity does not dictate whether the plain meaning of words 
can be departed from. Having said that, however, it bears repeating that the 
position taken in this article is that the Singapore approach is an adequate balance 
of fidelity to the history of the Indian Evidence Act and the advances of the 
modern contextual approach. Perhaps the drastic recourse to statutory reform 
can be put aside for now. 
f conclusIon
In conclusion, the modern contextual approach is not completely incompatible 
with the Indian Evidence Act. Both approaches, at least following one reading of 
the Supreme Court decision of Rainy Sky, seemingly adopt a starting point that 
words have plain or fixed meanings and, significantly, neither deems this as an 
irrebuttable position. The plain meaning can be departed from where its 
application results in an ambiguity. Both approaches also allow for the admission 
of extrinsic evidence to establish the context, although the Indian Evidence Act 
does so on a more restricted basis compared with the modern contextual approach. 
It is this more restrictive basis that differentiates the two approaches. However, it 
would be wrong to think that the Indian Evidence Act does not freely admit 
extrinsic evidence; it does, but only for the specific purpose of ascertaining 
whether there is ambiguity, which is required before further evidence may be 
admitted to interpret the contractual word in a positive fashion. While this may 
rightly be regarded as a shortcoming of the Indian Evidence Act, it is submitted 
that the integrated approach from Singapore may be a good balance before 
statutory reform can be envisaged. Such an approach, while commercially 
pragmatic, is also (to a large extent) theoretically and doctrinally sound. It should 
be pursued over the full (though historical) adherence to the Indian Evidence Act, 
as well as full rejection of the same.
